This paper studies the determinants of a firm's organizational form in the context of an imperfectly competitive industry. There are two kinds of organizational forms: the multi-divisional form (M-form) and the unitary form (U-form). An M-form firm suffers from ignorance of demand externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated. In contrast, in a U-form firm, demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists. A firm's optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure.
Introduction
Two kinds of organizational forms have been studied extensively in the literature: the unitary organizational form (U-form) and the multi-divisional organizational form (M-form). This article studies how market structure affects a firm's choice between the U-form and the M-form organizational form. Market structure refers specifically to the number of firms in the industry, and how market demand for different products may be related. Each firm produces two products. To produce each product, both production and marketing activities are needed. In a Uform organization, there is a middle manager of production and a middle manager for marketing. 1 Chandler (1962) records that du Pont, General Motors, and some other firms' changed their organizational modes from the U-form to the M-form in the 1920s. At that period, many firms began to produce multiple products. As a result, top managers could not supervise all decisions. Top managers had two options. The first option was to keep organizing firms by functional departments and give managers of functional departments more authority. The second one was to adopt the M-form organizational mode. By giving product managers more authority, top managers can concentrate on more strategic issues. See Williamson (1985) for some additional study on this issue.
Each functional manager maximizes his or her division's profit. In an M-form organization, there is a middle manager for each product. Each product manager maximizes his or her product division's profit. Firms are assumed to engage in Cournot competition.
Each organizational form has its own advantages and disadvantages. In a U-form firm, demand externalities between different products are taken into consideration. However, a U-form firm may suffer from double marginalization because the middle manager of production chooses transfer prices to maximize the production division's profit. An M-form firm eliminates double marginalization. On the other hand, a product manager in an M-form firm may be only concerned with the profit of the product she supervises, ignoring the fact that market demand for different goods are interdependent.
In this article, we show that a firm's optimal choice of organizational form depends on the number of firms in the industry, and whether goods are substitutes or complements. As firms face the same price, a firm has a higher profit, if and only if, it has a higher output. Whether a U-form or an M-form firm has a higher output depends on whether the two products are substitutes or complements. When the two products are substitutes, it is shown that adopting the M-form organizational mode gives a firm higher profit than adopting the U-form organizational mode.
When there are multiple firms in the industry, the over-expansion of output of an M-form firm is beneficial to this firm as this expansion makes other firms in the industry less aggressive. In contrast, the U-form firm's output is too low, but it is a positive externality to other firms. As a result, an M-form firm makes a higher profit than a U-form firm when there are multiple firms in the industry. In this sense, the economics is similar to that of Fershtman and Judd (1987) , except that the choice of organizational form is probably a far more credible commitment than the contractual commitments considered in their paper.
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When products are strong complements, the U-form firm has a higher output and profit because the demand externalities are taken into consideration. As the number of firms in the industry increases, whether the difference of output increases or not, depends on whether the slope of the U-form firm's reaction curve is larger or smaller than that of an M-form firm.
Two issues merit some explanation. The first issue is that neither the U-form nor the Mform organizational mode may be optimal. Even if this is the case, a study of the choice between 2 Related studies include Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996) and Tan and Yuan (2003) . Both papers study a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms choose their divisionalization or divestiture strategies. In the second stage, divisions engage in quantity or price competition. the U-form and the M-form organizational mode can still be justified. One reason is that the optimal organizational form may be too complex to be implemented in real world situations. As the U-form and the M-form organizations are commonly observed in real world situations, there is some merit in understanding the advantages and disadvantages of adopting these organizational forms. The second issue is that one may wonder whether a U-form firm suffers from double marginalization or not. In real world situations, double marginalization is frequently observed.
How to decide transfer prices between different functional departments is not a trivial issue in a large organization. Based on survey data, Eccles and White (1988) find that mandated marketbased transfer pricing is one of the three kinds of transfer pricing policies commonly used by firms. 4 When a firm adopts this kind of pricing policy, internal transactions are valued at market prices. "Buying profit centers that pay market price commonly complain that the intermediate good is being 'marked up twice', once by the selling profit center and again by the buying profit center" (Eccles and White 1988, p. S31) . Eccles and White (1988) record a case in which the transfer price of an intermediate input is twice the production cost of that input.
For the literature on organizational forms, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) , Aghion and Tirole (1995) , Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) , and Qian, Roland, and Xu (2002) . The approach of modeling organizational forms used in this article is similar to that of Aghion and Tirole (1995) .
In their paper, a firm produces two products and each product needs production and marketing activities. A U-form organizational form is organized into the production department and the marketing department. An M-form organizational firm is organized by products. None of the above papers studies how a firm's choice of organizational form is affected by the market structure.
However, market structure, such as the number of firms in the industry and how market demand for different products is related, provides the basic environment in which firms operate. As a firm's marginal benefit and marginal cost are affected by market structure, a firm's optimal choice of organizational form is affected by market structure. In fact, the influence of market structure on a firm's behavior is well recognized in the literature. For example, Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that a firm's choice of incentive scheme depends on market structure. When a firm is a monopolist in an industry, owners of this firm will try to get the managers to maximize profit. When a firm is 3 See Eccles and White (1988) for the conflict between middle level managers about transfer prices. 4 The other two methods are mandated full cost transfers and exchange autonomy transfers. one of multiple firms in the industry, owners will provide incentives to managers to expand output to take advantage of the strategic interaction among firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and compares the equilibrium output and profit of the two organizational forms. In Section 3, equilibrium organizational forms are studied. Section 4 studies the special case of linear market demand.
Section 5 discusses some assumptions of this paper and concludes.
The Model
There are firms in an industry, ≥ 1. For all these firms, suppose of them adopt the U-form and − of them adopt the M-form organizational mode. Each firm produces two products: and . Producing each product requires two activities: production and marketing. How activities are organized depends on the decision of the top manager of a firm. There are three levels of managers in each firm: top, middle, and low-level managers. The top manager of a firm chooses which organizational form to adopt. If a top manager chooses the M-form, for each of the two products, the production stage and the marketing stage will be supervised by the same middle manager. The two middle managers in an M-form firm will be called the middle manager for product and the middle manager for product . If the top manager chooses the U-form, one middle manager will supervise the two production departments and the other middle manager will supervise the two marketing departments. The two middle managers in a U-form firm will be called the middle manager for production and the middle manager for marketing. Middle managers choose quantities of production. A low-level manager follows the instruction of a middle manager on how much to produce.
All firms have the same fixed and marginal costs of production. The fixed cost of production is . Let the constant marginal cost of production be denoted by . The marginal cost of marketing is also assumed to be constant and is normalized to zero.
When multiple firms produce the same product, they engage in Cournot competition. For , = , and ≠ , let denote the price of product . Let denote total industry output of product . Market demand for product is given by an inverse demand function = ( , ), , = , , and ≠ .
Let and be positive constants. A special case of (1) is given by = − − , , = , , and ≠ .
It is assumed that the inverse demand functions are symmetric with respect to the two products. As a result, ( , ) = ( , ) for all and .
Whether the two products are complements or substitutes depends on the sign of ( , )/ . If ( , )/ < 0, the two products are substitutes; if ( , )/ > 0, the two products are complements; if ( , )/ = 0, the market demand of the two goods is independent. If ( , )/ = ( , )/ , the two products are perfect substitutes.
The following assumptions about the inverse demand functions are made.
.
Assumption 1 implies that inverse demand functions have a negative slope. Assumption 2 implies that the demand of a product is influenced more by its own price change than by the price change of the other product. Assumptions 1 and 2 together lead to
This inequality rules out the possibility that a product's price may increase when total quantity supplied increases.
Decisions in a U-form Firm
In this subsection, the optimal decisions in a U-form firm are studied. In a U-form firm, the middle manager of production decides how much to produce first. The marketing department cannot sell more than what the production department produces. It is assumed that the manager of production chooses transfer prices to maximize her division's profit, rather than the whole firm's profit. However, when choosing transfer prices, she takes it into account that her decisions will affect final demand for her firm's products and thus her division's profit.
The assumption that the middle manager of production sets transfer prices to maximize her division's profit rather than the firm's profit merits some discussion. Why doesn't the top manger decide the amount of production and the transfer prices? For a small firm, a top manger may be able to make all the important decisions. However, for a large firm, the top manager may not have as much information about cost and market demand as a middle manager has. Whether a middle manager is evaluated by her absolute performance or by a rank-order tournament, a middle manager's payoff increases with her own department's revenue. Therefore, a middle level manager has incentives to maximize her division's profit.
The middle manager of marketing chooses quantities to sell to maximize the marketing division's profit. Let denote product 's transfer price between the production department and the marketing department, = , . Let denote a representative U-form firm's product output.
Since the same middle manager supervises the sale of both products, this manager will take into account the fact that market demands are interdependent. Given the transfer prices charged by the production departments, this middle manager of marketing maximizes the sum of the profits of the two products
Taking first order condition with respect to leads to
The middle manager of production chooses transfer prices to maximize the production division's profit. Through backward induction, a U-form firm's middle manager of production can figure out the final demand as a function of transfer prices. She chooses and to maximize her division's profit
Taking first order condition with respect to yields
Differentiation of (4) with respect to , , and leads to
The above system can be expressed as
The determinant of the coefficient matrix is
Application of the Cramer's rule leads to
Since demand is symmetric, equations 8 and 10 lead to
From equations 9 and 10, it is clear that
In a symmetric equilibrium, = = . Plugging equation 12 into 6 yields = − .
From 13, the transfer price will be larger than the production cost if and only if − / is positive. The following assumption is sufficient for − / to be positive.
Assumption 3 states that a U-form firm's marginal revenue must not rise with its rivals' outputs. It is a weak assumption. Similar assumptions are standard in Cournot analysis.
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For example, for denoting the output of a product and denoting the price, Novshek (1985) shows that ′( ) + ′′( ) ≤ 0 guarantees the existence of a Cournot equilibrium. Assumption 3 is the 5 Dixit (1986) and Shapiro (1989) provide more motivation for these assumptions. Dixit (1986) also illustrates the relationship between these kinds of assumptions and stability conditions. analogy of the above inequality for the case when there are two products. If Assumption 3 is satisfied, the reaction curve of a U-form firm has a negative slope.
The following assumptions are similar to Assumption 3.
ASSUMPTION 4:
≡ + + + < 0.
Assumption 4 states that an M-form firm's marginal revenue must not rise with its rivals' outputs. If Assumption 4 is satisfied, the reaction curve of an M-form firm has a negative slope.
Assumption 5 states that a U-form firm's marketing department's marginal revenue must not rise with other firms' outputs. If Assumption 5 is satisfied, the transfer price does not decrease with the U-form firm's output.
6 Novshek (1985) shows that if a firm's marginal revenue is everywhere a declining function of the aggregate output of other firms, a Cournot equilibrium exists. In his proof, firms are not required to be identical. From Novshek (1985) , Assumptions 3-5 guarantee the existence of a Cournot equilibrium.
In a symmetric equilibrium, = = . Plugging equation 13 into 4 leads to one of the two equations defining optimal output choices
Decisions in an M-form Firm
In this subsection, the output decisions of an M-form firm are studied. It is assumed that the middle manager of product 's payoff is not affected by the profit of product . In other words, a tournament incentive scheme or a profit-sharing incentive scheme is not used here. One reason why these incentive schemes are not used is that it is hard to prevent collusion of middle managers or collusion between the top manager and a middle manager, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) for a related argument. In addition, when there are more than one firm in the industry, a profit-sharing scheme may decrease this firm's output and benefit its competitors, see Freshtman and Judd (1987) for a study of strategic manipulation of incentives in oligopolistic competition. Let denote this firm's output of product , = , . The middle manager of product is concerned only with product 's profit and he ignores demand externality imposed on product . Thus, the middle manager of product maximizes the divisional profit
Taking first order condition with respect to yields the second equation defining optimal output choices
Comparison of the Two Organizational Forms
In this subsection, the output and profit of the two organizational forms are compared. In a symmetric equilibrium, = = . Equations 13 and 14 lead to
Equation 16 leads to
In a symmetric equilibrium, all U-form firms produce the same amount of output . All M-form firms produce the same amount of output . In a symmetric equilibrium, output of the two products are the same and = = . Thus, total industry output is given by
Define a constant ≡ .
Then

≡ ( + (1 − ) ). (19')
The profit from adopting the U-form organizational mode is
The profit from adopting the M-form organizational mode is
As firms receive the same price for their product, a firm has a higher profit, if and only if, it has a higher output. The following proposition compares the output and the profit of an M-form firm with that of a U-form firm. Differentiation of 17 with respect to , , , and yields
Differentiation of 18 with respect to , , , and yields
Equations 21 and 22 can be expressed as
From equations 17, 18, and 19', it can be shown that
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For a detailed study on double marginalization, see Spengler (1950) .
= ( − )
. (31) The determinant of the coefficient matrix for equation 23 is
From equations 11 and 13, it can be shown that
Under Assumption 5,
From 33 and Assumptions 1-5, > 0.
The following lemma studies how each firm's output and total output change with the number of firms in the industry while the proportion of M-form firms does not change. 
(ii) Differentiation of equation 19 with respect to yields 
Equilibrium Organization Mode
In this section, the firms' equilibrium choice of organizational forms is studied. In equilibrium, no firm can make a profit by switching to a different organizational form. In addition, each firm should make a nonnegative profit in equilibrium.
The following lemma studies the impact of a firm's switching from the M-form to the Uform when the number of firms in the industry is fixed. 
PROOF. (i) Applying
Cramer's rule, from equations 27 and 31, it can be shown that (ii) Differentiation of 19 with respect to yields
Plugging equations 39 and 40 into 41 yields 
Linear Demand
In this section, the case of linear demand is studied. This additional structure leads to stronger results. Also, the impact of a change in the degree of substitution can be parameterized and examined. The inverse demand function is given by equation 2. In this linear case, / + / < 0 requires that 2 + 3 > 0. If > 0, the two products are substitutes; if = 0, the demand for the two products are independent; if < 0, the two products are complements.
Equations 2, 14, and 17 lead to
From equations 43a and 43b, when increases, and decrease. Thus, each firm's output decreases with the degree of substitutability between the two products. A U-form firm's output decreases at a higher rate than that of an M-form firm.
Plugging equations 47a and 47b into equation 19 yields
( − ).
In a symmetric equilibrium, market prices of the two products are the same, = = .
Plugging 44 into 2 leads to
From equations 43a and 45, the profit of a U-form firm is
− .
From equations 43b and 45, the profit of an M-form firm is
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for all firms to adopt the M-form (the U-form) organizational mode. as firms are indifferent between the two organizational forms, the M-form mode coexists with the U-form mode. Finally, a U-form monopolist's profit is always less than an M-form monopolist's profit if products are substitutes. So a monopolist's profit is higher if it adopts the M-form even when goods are perfect substitutes ( = ). This is surprising, as we may have thought that either organization form has some disadvantages and no one form will dominate the other.
In the literature, there are some empirical and experimental studies comparing the performance of the U-form and the M-form firms. Studying a sample of petroleum firms during the period 1955 -1973 , Armour and Teece (1978 conclude that empirical results are broadly consistent with the M-form hypothesis which states that the M-form leads to a higher profit level than the U-form organizational mode. In Burton and Obel's (1988) experimental study, they conclude that the M-form hypothesis is supported. In a laboratory experiment in which students assumed the divisional and departmental manager roles, the M-form organization leads to greater total profits than the U-form under which format opportunistic behavior is possible.
Conclusion
If product quantities can be contracted on ex ante, organizational forms will not matter. In real world situations, many contingencies cannot be foreseen and contracted upon. As a result, organizational forms play important roles in affecting managers' incentives. A natural question is which factors determine a firm's optimal choice of organizational form. Both the U-form and the M-form organizational modes have advantages and disadvantages. In this paper, it is shown that a firm's optimal choice of organizational form is affected by market structure.
One important assumption in this paper is that firms provide homogenous products and engage in quantity competition. If firms produce differentiated products and engage in price competition, the result will be more complicated. As the type of reaction curve is only one of the two factors affecting a firm's organizational choice (the other one being the tradeoff between double marginalization and the ignorance of demand externalities), changing the type of competition is not likely to reverse the results established in this article. In the case of homogenous product, as firms receive the same price, a firm has a higher profit if and only if it has a higher level of output. With differentiated products, firms have different quantities of production and also different prices. It is difficult to compare the profit levels of different types of firms. For example, consider the case when the two products are substitutes. With the existence of double marginalization and the consideration that the two products are substitutes, the price of a U-form firm will be higher than that of an M-form firm. But it is unclear whether the profit of a U-form firm is higher or lower than that of an M-form firm.
In this paper, both organizational forms are assumed to have the same level of fixed cost of production. An alternative approach is that for a U-form firm, the fixed cost is , while in an M-form firm, the fixed cost is 2 . Thus a U-form firm has the benefits of economies of scale. One source of economies of scale may come from the large volume purchase of raw materials and joint marketing in a U-form firm. The existence of significant economies of scale may justify the existence of large U-form firms.
The model may be extended in various directions. First, in this article, each firm produces only two products. The case where a firm produces more than two products may be studied.
Second, there are no demand or cost uncertainties. These kinds of uncertainties may play important roles in affecting firms' optimal choice of organizational forms. Finally, it has been assumed that marginal production cost and marginal marketing cost are constant. Generalization to a general cost function may be an interesting topic for future research.
